Tensions are escalating between the U.S. and Venezuela as President Donald Trump increases his military pressure over alleged drug trafficking. However, Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, has pushed back diplomatically, rather than through military force: rallying international allies for support and warning that U.S. actions threaten the country’s sovereignty. 

U.S. Claims & Actions

According to the Trump administration, its actions against Venezuela are part of a war on drugs and a crackdown on illegal immigration.  The administration argues that Venezuela has become a hub for fentanyl and cocaine entering the United States. Trump claims that President Nicolás Maduro is “emptying prisons and insane asylums,” sending those people toward the U.S. border, and accused Maduro of personally leading the Cartel de los Soles, alleged criminal networks within the Armed Forces of Venezuela, which the administration has designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Anyone involved in Venezuelan drug-trafficking networks is treated as a “narco-terrorist” and therefore a lawful military target: a person the U.S. can legally attack. The White House insists its actions are meant to protect Americans from drugs, crime and warfare conducted by traffickers against the U.S.

The U.S. has launched Operation Southern Spear, the largest military deployment in the Caribbean since the 1989 invasion of Panama. More than 15,000 troops, 100 warplanes and a dozen warships have been positioned around Venezuela. Since September, the U.S. has conducted over 20 strikes on boats alleged to be carrying drugs, killing over 80 people. In the final days of November, Trump declared Venezuelan airspace “closed,” threatening strikes and authorized force against suspected traffickers as part of a “non-international armed conflict.”

Is Venezuela actually a threat to U.S. drug trafficking?

Although the Trump administration claims that Venezuela is a major distributor of fentanyl and cocaine, experts and U.S. government data indicate that this narrative is not true. According to Counternarcotics analysts, Venezuela is not a primary source of fentanyl or cocaine bound for the U.S. market. There is a concern with fentanyl, as the drug drives the majority of U.S. overdose deaths, but not in Venezuela; the drug is overwhelmingly produced in Mexico and smuggled almost exclusively over land across the southern U.S. border, not via boats leaving Venezuela. Colombia supplies 84% of the cocaine that reaches the United States, arriving through Pacific routes originating in Colombia or Ecuador, rather than through the Caribbean corridor near Venezuela. Almost three-quarters of the cocaine headed for the U.S. travels through the Pacific, with only a minor portion making its way through the Caribbean. 

Moreover, experts say the majority of cocaine moving out of Venezuela is not headed for the United States at all, but to Europe, where profits are higher and penalties are lighter. For example, Spain punishes cocaine trafficking with roughly 3-9 years in prison, Portugal with 4-12 years (up to 16 for major cases), and the Netherlands with typically 4-8 years, far lighter than U.S. federal sentences that often range from 10 years to life (usually 5-40 years). Narcotics specialists, former U.S. law enforcement officials and regional analysts agree that many of the vessels that the U.S. military forces in the Caribbean were likely transporting cocaine destined for European markets, not American ones. 

Criticism and Comments

The Trump administration’s actions have confused many news outlets, officials and political figures because of the way the administration approached the issue of fentanyl and cocaine entry into the U.S.

Non-partisan experts Jason Marczak and Matthew Kroenig believe Trump’s Venezuela policy lacks a coherent strategy and is driven by two conflicting motives: removing Maduro and stopping drug trafficking. Yet, neither objective is clearly defined nor realistically achievable through the actions the administration is taking. The massive military buildup is far too significant for a drug-interdiction mission but too unfocused to guarantee regime change, creating a dangerous, unpredictable situation that could escalate without weakening Maduro. 

Similarly, beyond the issue of drug-trafficking, The Times of India argues that Trump targets Maduro because of Venezuela’s location: the center of a political, strategic and ideological battle that he seeks to engage in. Marczak and Kroenig emphasise that the drug-trafficking problem and justification allows Trump to:

1. Pressure Maduro into exile without invading Venezuela.
2. Use the hemispheric migration and crime crisis as political leverage from neighboring countries for support.
3. Reassert U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere.
4. Counter U.S. rivals like Russia and China.
5. Maintain military options without committing to war. 
6. Potentially secure a legacy-defining victory if Maduro falls. 

In a New York Times opinion piece by Michael Waldman, president and chief executive of the Brennan Center for Justice, he claims that the Trump administration’s boat strikes raise serious legal and constitutional concerns, underscoring how the White House has manipulated its war powers in the light of fighting “narcoterrorism.” “The U.S. military might be guilty of murdering civilians on the high seas,” he writes, emphasizing that the administration has “stretched its authorities far beyond any reasonable interpretation of the law.”

Echoing Waldman’s statement, on the morning of December 2, Pope Leo XIV warned against a U.S. military escalation in Venezuela, urging the White House to abandon resourcing to attack and instead “seek dialogue” to prevent a dangerous and unnecessary conflict. 

Can murder ever be justified as part of a pressure campaign to remove Maduro, even if he is a dictator? 

Time Magazine argues that Trump, even if he successfully removes Maduro, will not establish democracy in Venezuela. Democratization is not as simple as replacing Maduro; a post-Maduro Venezuela would urgently require intricate institutional reconstruction: security, economic reform and de-radicalization. Without long-term commitment, technical expertise, or willingness to invest in the costly rebuilding of institutions, the U.S. under Trump can help remove a leader but not build a democracy, leaving Venezuela at risk of profound instability.